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 Executive Summary 
 
The Joint Standing Committee on Insurance and Financial Services of the 124th Maine 
Legislature directed the Bureau of Insurance to convene a working group of stakeholders to 
continue a discussion and review of several issues raised before the Committee during its 
consideration of LD 1285, An Act to Create the Insurance Fraud Division within the Bureau of 
Insurance.  The Bureau was also directed to submit a report to the Committee on behalf of the 
Working Group with findings and recommendations. 
   
The Bureau conducted three Working Group meetings in August and September 2009.  
Participants included representatives from 15 insurance companies, several insurance trade 
associations, the Maine Trial Lawyers Association, the Maine State Fire Marshal’s Office, the 
Maine Workers Compensation Board and the Office of the Maine Attorney General.  In addition 
to their participation in the Working Group sessions, members of the Working Group were 
invited to provide feedback on two preliminary drafts of this fraud unit report. 
 
The following highlights the issues and legal questions noting when there was agreement, 
disagreement, and the Bureau’s preferred approach: 
 
• Although the extent of the problem is difficult to quantify, most members of the Working 
Group agreed that insurance fraud is a problem in Maine and that a dedicated fraud unit 
would be a useful tool to combat fraud.  The Maine Trial Lawyers Association noted that 
there is no evidence of a significant problem. 
 
• All members of the Working Group agreed that if a fraud unit is established, it should 
have broad authority to investigate all areas of insurance fraud, including claims fraud, 
premium fraud, fraudulent insurer practices and any other type of fraud that affects the 
Maine insurance market. 
 
• Penalties for insurance fraud in Maine are adequate and do not need to be addressed at 
this time. 
 
• Based upon input from stakeholders, the Bureau believes that mandatory reporting of 
insurance fraud is most appropriately limited to insurers and should not extend to other 
insurance professionals. 
 
• Although many insurance industry representatives believed that immunity for reporting 
instances of fraud should be expanded to include insurer-to-insurer immunity, the Bureau 
believes that an appropriate immunity provision would be similar to that applicable to 
Fire Marshal investigations, which does not include insurer-to-insurer immunity.  
 
• All members of the Working Group agreed that a fraud unit should be headquartered in 
the Bureau of Insurance and that the unit would work closely with the Fire Marshal, the 
Attorney General and local prosecutors.  A dedicated prosecutor and resources at the 
   ii
 Office of the Attorney General would be needed to bring cases to trial.  Experience in 
other states with fraud units shows that an effective fraud unit must have adequate 
resources.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Working Group participants from the insurance industry were generally open to the need for 
the industry to fund a fraud unit; however, insurance industry members have expressed 
concerns that the total cost of a fraud unit should be reasonable and that the funding 
mechanism should be equitable among insurance companies.   
 
   iii
  
I. Introduction and Background 
 
A. Legislative Request for Study 
 
The Maine Legislature has been presented with proposals to create an insurance fraud division 
within the Bureau of Insurance during the last three legislative sessions.  Although the most 
recent bill, LD 1285, received an “ought not to pass” recommendation from the Joint Standing 
Committee on Insurance and Financial Services, the Committee asked Superintendent of 
Insurance Mila Kofman to convene a working group of stakeholders to consider issues that were 
raised during the Committee’s consideration of the bill.  The Superintendent has been asked to 
report to the Committee on behalf of the Working Group with findings and recommendations.  
  
B. Existing Law 
 
Maine law provides both criminal and civil penalties for insurance fraud, as well as statutory 
protections to combat fraud. 
 
The Maine Criminal Code makes both “insurance deception” and “deceptive insurance 
practices” criminal offenses,1 while the Maine Insurance Code provides civil penalties and 
administrative enforcement for “fraudulent insurance acts.”2
 
Insurers are currently required to take certain steps in order to combat fraud: 
 
• provide warnings on all insurance applications and claim forms that it is a crime to 
knowingly provide false, incomplete or misleading information to an insurance company 
for the purpose of defrauding the company, and that penalties may include imprisonment, 
fines or a denial of insurance benefits;3 
 
• report annually to the Bureau of Insurance on known or suspected Maine-related 
incidents of insurance fraud;4 
 
• implement antifraud plans that provide for specific procedures to prevent, detect and 
investigate insurance fraud; 
 
• educate employees regarding the plan and fraud detection; 
 
                                                 
1 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 354-A, 901-A. 
2 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2186(7). 
3 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2186(3). 
4 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2186(3). 
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 • provide for hiring or contracting with fraud investigators; and 
 
• provide for reporting of insurance fraud to appropriate law enforcement and regulatory 
authorities.5  
 
The Superintendent of Insurance is required to provide the Joint Standing Committee on 
Insurance and Financial Services with an annual report on insurance fraud.6
 
Relevant information relating to insurance fraud can be shared among authorized investigatory, 
prosecutorial and regulatory agencies.  These agencies include the Attorney General, district 
attorneys, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Fire Marshal, the Superintendent of 
Insurance, the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, State Police 
and local law enforcement, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.7  
Immunity from civil liability is provided when information is provided to or shared among 
authorized agencies.8  Information must remain confidential unless its release is required by a 
criminal or a civil proceeding.9
 
There is also a process for insurers to apply to the Superintendent of Insurance to conduct an 
inquest into insurance fraud and to report the findings of the result of the inquest to the insurer.10  
However, the Bureau of Insurance has no information suggesting that this provision has been 
used within the past 30 years.  The Bureau does not have fraud investigators, and most insurers 
have fraud investigatory capabilities of their own. 
 
C. Existing Bureau of Insurance Investigative Processes 
 
Information regarding insurance fraud may come to the Bureau’s attention in several ways: 
 
• as the result of an investigation by the Special Investigative Unit of an insurer;  
 
• from the Insurance Fraud Unit of another state;  
 
• from a member of the public; or 
 
• through the Bureau’s oversight of insurance companies, insurance producers, and other 
regulated individuals and business entities. 
 
The Bureau of Insurance is required to advise the Attorney General when it has reason to believe 
that a person has violated any provision of the Maine Insurance Code or other insurance law, 
                                                 
5 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2186(5). 
6 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2186(4). 
7 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2187. 
8 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2187(5). 
9 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2187(6). 
10 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2179. 
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 including but not limited to insurance fraud.11  The Bureau then works with the Attorney 
General’s Office toward an appropriate resolution of both civil and criminal matters.  Close 
cooperation between all of Maine’s investigative agencies is essential to an ability to cooperate 
with the federal, international and other state authorities often involved.  
 
Currently, no criminal prosecutors exist in Maine whose work focuses solely on insurance fraud.  
The Office of the Attorney General has a Financial Crimes and Civil Rights Division that 
oversees the prosecution of white collar and financial crimes, as well as frauds perpetrated 
against Maine State government, including welfare fraud, Medicaid fraud, tax crimes, securities 
violations, and a variety of civil rights programs.  As discussed below, most stakeholders noted 
that the lack of a dedicated fraud unit is an impediment to combating fraud.  
 
D. Working Group Process 
 
In response to the Committee’s request, the Bureau sought out an extensive group of potentially 
interested stakeholders to participate in the Working Group.  Superintendent Kofman appointed 
Deputy Superintendent Timothy Schott, a former criminal prosecutor, to chair the Working 
Group.  In addition to written invitations to participate, Deputy Superintendent Schott initiated 
personal contact with many groups to encourage them to participate so that their views might be 
brought forward.  Invitations were extended to all who had testified before the Insurance and 
Financial Services Committee on LD 1285, all who had participated in a similar study conducted 
in 2005, and other state agencies that the Bureau believed had a significant interest in the project.  
The Working Group included the State Fire Marshal’s Office, the Office of the Attorney 
General, and the Maine Workers’ Compensation Board.  Members of the Insurance and 
Financial Services Committee were also invited to attend and participate in the Working Group.  
 
The Bureau convened meetings of interested stakeholders on August 11, August 20 and 
September 10, 2009.  In addition to Superintendent Kofman and Bureau staff, the following 
organizations and interested persons participated in one or more Working Group meetings in 
person or by telephone: 
 
• Insurers:  Acadia Insurance Company, Anthem Health Plans of Maine, The Concord 
Group, Farmers Insurance Group, Hanover Insurance Company, Maine Employers’ 
Mutual Insurance Company, Medical Mutual Insurance Company, One Beacon Insurance 
Company, Patriot Insurance Company, Patrons Oxford Insurance Company, Progressive 
Insurance Company, State Farm Insurance Company, State Mutual Insurance Company, 
The Travelers Insurance Company, and UNUM Group. 
 
• Insurance Industry-related Associations:  Maine Association of Insurance Companies 
(MAIC), American Insurance Association, Property Casualty Insurers Association of 
America, Maine Insurance Agents Association (MIAA), American Council of Life 
Insurers, and the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB). 
 
                                                 
11 24-A M.R.S.A. § 214(2). 
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 • State Agencies:  Maine Fire Marshal’s Office, Maine Workers Compensation Board, and 
the Office of the Attorney General. 
 
• Other Organizations:  Coalition Against Insurance Fraud (CAIF), Maine Medical 
Association, Maine Private Investigators Association, and the Maine Trial Lawyers 
Association (MTLA). 
 
• Legislators:  Rep. Leslie Fossel, R-Alna. 
 
• Office of Policy and Legal Analysis:  Colleen McCarthy-Reid, Esq. 
 
• Individual:  Joseph Greenier. 
 
Participants were also invited to submit written comments on earlier drafts of this report.  
Comments were submitted by NICB, CAIF, MAIC, AIA, PCI, MADA, Hanover, State Farm, 
and MTLA. 12
 
During her welcoming remarks at the August 10 Working Group meeting, Superintendent 
Kofman stressed the need to protect businesses and consumers from fraudulent insurance and 
insurance-like scams (See Appendix B).  She specifically noted that we are seeing consumers 
“ripped off” by illegal car warranties, discount medical cards, and phony associations that lead 
consumers to believe they are buying real health insurance.  Superintendent Kofman asked 
Working Group members to take a holistic approach and consider all options. 
 
During the first meeting, Bureau staff and Working Group members introduced the following 
questions for consideration and began discussions around the following questions: 
 
1. Does Maine need a fraud unit? 
 
2. What are the model states for Maine to look at? 
 
3. How would the Insurance Fraud Unit be staffed? 
 
4. How would the Insurance Fraud Unit be funded? 
 
Bureau staff identified states that have implemented Fraud Units in a variety of market 
conditions, using a variety of organizational models.  Insurers were asked to provide a list of 
model states based on their experiences in those states.  For the second meeting, Bureau staff 
contacted states with fraud units to discuss successes and failures they have had in creating, 
operating, and sustaining their fraud units.  Bureau staff provided an overview of the comparison 
of states’ fraud units with respect to the issues presented at the first meeting during the second 
meeting, held Aug. 20.  Bureau staff reported back on research into insurance fraud unit statutes 
                                                 
12 Written comments and the final report will be posted on the Bureau of Insurance website. 
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 from other states, as well as national models adopted by the CAIF and the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 
 
Stakeholders described their internal fraud units and their experiences with other states’ fraud 
units in the context of the proposed questions. 
 
The third meeting of the Working Group, held Sept. 10, addressed legal questions related to 
establishing a dedicated fraud unit.  In particular, Working Group members addressed whether 
insurance fraud reporting should be mandatory or voluntary, immunity for fraud reporting, and 
confidentiality of information collected during an investigation. 
 
The Superintendent of Insurance has sought consensus, where possible, on the various issues 
considered by the Working Group.  While a consensus was achieved on some issues, the 
Working Group participants have different perspectives on others.  The fundamental issues 
identified by the Working Group are discussed below. 
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 II. Fundamental Issues Considered by the Working Group 
 
Core Issues Recommended Approach Stakeholder Reaction 
Mission and purpose Broad authority Consensus 
Civil or law 
enforcement authority 
Civil authority for Bureau 
of Insurance personnel 
No opposition 
Prohibited acts and 
penalties 
No need to revisit existing 
law 
No opposition 
Mandatory or voluntary 
reporting 
Mandatory for insurers, 
voluntary for producers and 
other licensees 
Consensus as to insurers, strong but 
not unanimous support as to 
producers 
Immunity from liability Keep current law, do not 
extend to insurer-to-insurer 
reporting 
Disagreement as to whether to 
extend immunity to insurer-to-
insurer reporting 
Confidentiality of 
investigative 
information 
Maintain and clarify current 
confidentiality provisions 
Consensus 
Unit location Multidisciplinary, 
headquartered in Bureau of 
Insurance 
No opposition 
Fraud Unit staffing Bureau staff and dedicated 
AG prosecutor and 
detective 
No consensus on staffing levels 
Funding Insurers fund new unit 
 
 
Clear formula or method; 
assessment with cap 
Insurers willing to fund but funding 
mechanism needs to be equitable 
and reasonable  
Varying opinions, with general 
agreement that the financial 
obligation on insurers must be 
predictable 
Need for fraud unit Unable to reach consensus.  
Funding mechanism must 
be resolved.  
Strong opposition by MTLA, strong 
support by other stakeholders  
A. Does Maine Need an Insurance Fraud Unit? 
Forty-one states and the District of Columbia currently have insurance fraud units.  Although 
most stakeholders expressed the view that an insurance fraud unit in Maine could play a valuable 
role in the fight against insurance fraud, the MTLA expressed strong concerns.   
Stakeholder comments:  MTLA representatives pointed to a lack of state-specific statistical 
information supporting the need for a fraud unit in Maine, while proponents cited national trends 
of increased fraud reports, as well as past reports that support the creation of a fraud unit.  MTLA 
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 noted that supporters were relying on anecdotal evidence, and that the existing Financial Crimes 
Division of the Attorney General’s Office is well suited to handle such cases as may arise. 
Superintendent Kofman asked stakeholders to provide concrete data that supports the creation of 
a fraud unit, including estimates of premium savings and documentation of what has happened in 
other states after fraud units were created. 
Several representatives of the insurance industry supported the creation of a fraud unit because 
they believe insurance fraud is a significant problem both in Maine and throughout the country.  
During their presentation on other states’ fraud units, Bureau staff noted that many of the state 
officials with whom they spoke noted a recent increase in insurance fraud activity, which they 
generally believe to be related to the economic situation in the United States.  Of particular 
interest, New Hampshire has experienced an increase in suspected insurance fraud cases in the 
first six months of 2009 and noted several instances of cross-border situations involving persons 
operating from Maine. 
Despite 2,093 cases of suspected insurance fraud in Maine reported by insurers to the Bureau in 
200713, there appear to have been relatively few actual referrals to either the NICB or to 
government agencies.  Fifty-three insurers reported referring cases of suspected insurance fraud 
in 2007 and 2008.  The breakdown of referrals is as follows: 
Referrals to 2007 2008 
District Attorneys 7 4
U.S. Attorney 1 15
U.S. Postal Inspectors and BOI 3 10
Workers’ Compensation Board Fraud and Abuse Unit 36 23
Other law enforcement* 44 34
National Insurance Crime Bureau 209 232
Total 300 318
*agencies mentioned in this category include the U.S. Secret Service, local police, Bureau of Motor Vehicles and the 
Fire Marshal’s Office. 
The State Fire Marshal’s Office advised the Working Group that from January 1, 2008, to 
August 10, 2009, there were 216 incendiary fires in Maine.  Of those, fraud has been identified 
as a collateral crime in 35 situations.  Many cases are still under investigation, so the number 
could increase. 
Regarding the national trends, a representative from CAIF reiterated the statistics provided 
during the public hearing on LD 1285 that, per 100,000 people, Maine had 158.4 suspected 
frauds in comparison to New York at 114, California at 65, and Washington at 12.5.  In addition, 
                                                 
13 The Bureau is required to report annually to the legislature.  The 2007 “report on insurance fraud” is available on 
our webpage.  Due to a conversion to on-line reporting, it was necessary for bureau staff to validate the 2008 
reported data.  It is our estimate that the final 2008 report will be finalized by the end of this calendar year. 
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 CAIF’s Web site contains statistical information for 2007 regarding the scope of insurance fraud 
nationally, but, according to the Web site: 
Measuring insurance fraud is an elusive target.  No single national agency gathers 
omnibus fraud statistics.  Insurance fraud data thus are relatively piecemeal, making our 
understanding of insurance fraud an ongoing work in progress.  Insurance companies and 
diverse state and federal agencies each gather fraud data related to their own missions.  
But the kind, quality, and volume of data they compile vary widely.  Independent 
watchdogs, academics, insurance industry groups and other organizations also conduct 
research on a variety of fraud topics.  Some is national in scope and some state-specific.   
(See Appendix C).  
A representative from MAIC indicated that trade journals have reported an increase in fraud 
nationally, and a representative from NICB said that NICB has seen an increase from 96 to 118, 
or 22.9 percent, in questionable claim referrals reported from 2007 to 2008. The types of claim 
referrals include arsons, vehicle thefts, bodily injury, and medical claims.  
CAIF acknowledges in its written comments that “A key question to ask is why is there a 
discrepancy between the amount of suspected fraud that insurers have reported to the bureau for 
its annual report and referrals to government agencies.”  According to CAIF, “The answer is 
really simple....  Without a specific fraud division, there is little incentive for the reporting of 
suspected frauds when an insurer knows that law enforcement or prosecutors will not move 
forward with a case.”  Some stakeholders made this point at the hearing, noting that even when 
they have a well-developed case to present, they have difficulty in finding a local prosecutor in 
Maine to take it on due to resource priorities. 
Bureau:  There is no dispute whether or not there is fraud.  The critical question is how 
widespread the problem is in Maine.     
B. Mission and Purpose 
The criminal mind is infinitely creative, and insurance fraud consists of a wide range of 
activities.  To some people, the phrase “insurance fraud” suggests what is often referred to as 
“external fraud,” the presentation of fraudulent claims to insurance companies by policyholders, 
health care providers, and alleged accident victims.  However, perpetrators also include 
insurance producers engaging in such activities as premium theft and deceptive sales practices, 
insurance company insiders, insurers themselves, and fly-by-night entities operating at the 
fringes of the industry.  As PCI has observed, “fraud is fraud,” and must be investigated and 
prosecuted.  Superintendent Kofman made clear that she had strong concerns with the activities 
of fictitious insurers, bogus health discount cards, and dubious “warranty” arrangements.  The 
Superintendent noted that it is essential that if an insurance fraud unit is established it must be 
able to protect the public by addressing every type of fraudulent activity. 
 
Background:  The emphasis of a fraud unit may vary depending on the matters being brought to 
its attention and market conditions.   
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MA Example: In Lawrence, Massachusetts, the Insurance Fraud Bureau partnered with the 
Lawrence Police Department and the Essex County District Attorney to establish a Community 
Insurance Fraud Initiative.  As of June 23, 2009, this initiative had resulted in insurance fraud 
charges being filed against 369 people including chiropractors, attorneys, runners, and average 
citizens.  Since then, Lawrence has seen a dramatic drop in insurance claim levels.  Before the 
initiative, for every 100 automobile accidents in Lawrence, 141 personal injuries were reported -- 
nearly four times the statewide average.  By 2008 that statistic had dropped to 48 injuries per 100 
accidents.  Auto insurance premiums for the residents of Lawrence have been reduced by $40 
million.14
 
Fraud division directors in both Colorado and Florida cautioned Bureau staff as to the need to 
assure that, irrespective of location, the fraud unit’s ability to conduct investigations was 
sufficiently broad to allow it to continue to investigate cases that may have begun as insurance 
fraud investigations but developed into investigations of other crimes as they progressed. 
 
Stakeholder comments:  MTLA expressed the concern that insurers would use the threat of 
referral to an insurance fraud unit as leverage against claimants.  MTLA noted the importance of 
a fraud unit having the authority to investigate all types of fraudulent activity, including fraud 
committed by persons within the insurance industry as well as members of the public.  There was 
no disagreement from the rest of the Working Group. 
 
Another issue to consider is the type of cases that belong within the authority of the fraud unit.  
There was consensus that due to limited resources, a fraud unit would have to be strategic.  A 
strategic use of resources would include staged accident rings, phony and inflated claim rings, 
and unlicensed insurers.  In cases in which the fraud unit is not the primary investigating agency, 
it would partner with  local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and prosecutors.  
 
Bureau:  Authority should not be limited to investigate particular types of cases but should be 
broad to respond to market conditions. 
 
C. Law Enforcement Status for Investigators 
 
The Working Group considered whether an insurance fraud unit should have full powers of law 
enforcement officers or only civil authority, and what types of cases the Insurance Fraud Unit 
would investigate.  The consensus was that civil authority was generally appropriate, but only if 
civil investigators are well trained and there is adequate access to law enforcement resources 
when needed. 
 
Background:  States vary on the scope of authority granted to fraud investigation units.  Some 
larger states, such as Florida, have both criminal and civil investigatory units within their fraud 
units, while in other states, such as New Hampshire and Montana, the insurance fraud unit 
investigators are not law enforcement officers.  They establish working relationships with other 
                                                 
14 June 23, 2009 Press Release of the Massachusetts Insurance Fraud Bureau, “Insurance Bureau CIFI Program 
Marks Five Years of Progress,” http://www.ifb.org. 
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 agencies where necessary.  It has been noted that typically, law enforcement officers are more 
expensive to train and employ than civil investigators. 
 
In states where fraud investigators have full law enforcement powers, they are able to serve 
search warrants and make arrests.  They are authorized to carry weapons and have similar 
training to other law enforcement officers in their state.  While they operate according to 
criminal investigatory procedures applicable in their states, prosecutorial discretion and 
information sharing capability with other authorized agencies allow for civil as well as criminal 
remedies to be pursued as appropriate. 
 
Stakeholder comments:  One stakeholder recommended that a fraud unit have full law 
enforcement authority and suggested using the State Fire Marshal’s Office as a model.  The 
Maine State Fire Marshal’s Office has both a Criminal Division and an Inspection Division, 
which work together as necessary and appropriate. 
 
Other states and Working Group members reported experiences suggesting that efforts to 
investigate insurance fraud are most successful when trained, dedicated fraud investigators work 
closely with dedicated prosecutors to pursue cases to conclusion. 
 
Working Group members and officials with fraud units in other states noted that the staff of 
insurance fraud investigatory units are heavily populated by persons with significant law 
enforcement investigatory experience, often former police detectives.  Staff with significant 
experience in the business of insurance are also frequently employed by insurance fraud units. 
 
The director of the Attorney General’s Financial Crimes Division noted that there are models 
within Maine government, such as Maine Revenue Services, for agencies that have criminal 
investigators who are not certified law enforcement officers.  She also noted the cooperative 
ability of people in various agencies handling civil and criminal cases, and that the issue comes 
down to training.  
 
Bureau:  The consensus was that civil authority is generally appropriate but requires proper 
training of staff. 
 
D. Prohibited Acts and Penalties 
 
The Working Group discussed the existing criminal penalties for insurance fraud, and concluded 
that they are sufficient and do not need to be revisited. 
 
E. Mandatory or Voluntary Reporting 
 
Currently, although the Maine Insurance Fraud Prevention Act requires insurers to file annual 
fraud reports on an aggregate basis,15 reporting of individual incidents of insurance fraud is 
voluntary.  LD 1285 proposed requiring insurers to report the incident to the Superintendent if 
                                                 
15 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2186(4); Bureau of Insurance Rule 920. 
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 they have knowledge or reasonable belief that a fraudulent insurance act has been, is being, or 
will be committed.  Insurance producers and other persons acting on behalf of insurers would 
have been expressly exempted from this duty.  Working Group members agreed that mandatory 
reporting of cases by insurers would be appropriate.  There was also consensus that any member 
of the public should be able to come forward to report suspected insurance fraud to the fraud unit 
on a discretionary basis, as provided for in Section 4 of LD 1285.  There was disagreement, 
however, as to whether producers should be required to report insurance fraud.   
 
Stakeholder comments.  Bureau staff reported that all the states contacted recommended 
mandatory reporting by insurers of cases of suspected fraud because it gives a better overall 
picture of the situation, and mandatory reporting allows states to prioritize cases.  In order to 
prevent over-reporting, one insurer advocated “concise language that mandatory reporting occur 
when there has been an identified violation, rather than mere suspicion.” 
 
MTLA recommended that all licensed personnel be required to report situations in which they 
suspect fraud to the fraud unit.  Such a requirement would include, among others, insurance 
producers, adjusters, and consultants. MTLA believes this might help uncover situations in 
which elements within the insurance industry are engaged in illegal behavior, and asserted that 
limiting mandatory reporting to insurers would be a “fatal flaw.” 
 
The Maine Insurance Agents Association opposed MTLA’s recommendation.  They observed 
that insurance producers are agents of the insurers, and the information producers would be 
reporting would generally be in the insurers’ reports.  MTLA also expressed concern that 
adequate protection against retaliation (whistleblower protection) would need to be provided to 
protect producers if they were required to come forward in all situations. 
 
Although not discussed by the Working Group, similar arguments would appear to apply to 
others employed within the industry, such as claims adjusters.  Neither the NAIC nor CAIF 
Model Insurance Fraud Prevention Acts mandates insurance producers to report insurance fraud, 
and no information has been provided to the Working Group as to any state that requires it. 
 
Bureau:  Mandatory fraud reporting is a valuable fraud prevention tool, but the requirement 
should be limited to insurers, as it is in other states with such requirements.  The standard must 
also be carefully worded to avoid being too broad or too narrow.  The “knowledge or reasonable 
belief” standard used in the current voluntary reporting requirement and proposed in LD 1285 is 
a reasonable standard. 
 
F. Immunity from Liability 
 
Current Maine law provides immunity from civil liability, in the absence of fraud, malice, or bad 
faith, to any person reporting fraud to authorized law enforcement or regulatory agencies.16  The 
Working Group agreed that this immunity provision should be retained. 
 
                                                 
16 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2187(4). 
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 There was significant controversy, however, as to whether immunity should be expanded, as 
proposed in LD 1285, to grant immunity for communications between insurers.   
 
Stakeholder comments.  The Working Group considered immunity laws from other states.  
Representatives from the insurance industry, CAIF, and the NICB supported expansion of 
immunity, asserting that broad immunity assists investigations.  Several stakeholders discussed 
the need to share information with other insurance carriers and identify individuals who have 
filed multiple claims with multiple insurers.  Others described firewalls between companies’ 
special investigation (fraud) units and claims investigations units that often thwart full 
investigation.  One insurer requested that if insurer-to-insurer immunity is not adopted at this 
time, it remain under advisement. 
 
MTLA questioned the need for insurer-to-insurer immunity and noted that it is “highly unusual” 
for two private parties to be given immunity with respect to communications in this fashion, 
especially when the communications in question can have a significant adverse impact on third 
persons. 
 
A representative from the Fire Marshal’s Office noted that while the Office may communicate 
with multiple insurers regarding a particular investigation, it does not see the need for the 
insurers to have immunity with respect to their own communications with each other. 
 
When the Superintendent suggested modeling immunity language for the Insurance Fraud Unit 
after the Fire Marshal’s immunity language, there was no disagreement.  However, no consensus 
was reached with regard to insurer-to-insurer immunity.   
 
Bureau:  No change to the immunity law is recommended at this time.  The issue could be 
revisited subsequently, after experience has been developed with the recommendations in this 
Report and there has been time to evaluate whether the concerns perceived by the various 
stakeholders have been addressed. 
 
G. Confidentiality 
 
Currently, the Maine Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, the Arson Reporting Act, and the Criminal 
History record Information Act all provide broad confidentiality protection for investigative 
information held by authorized agencies.17  There was consensus among the Working Group that 
investigative information relating to insurance fraud held by a state insurance fraud unit should 
be treated the same as that held by other law enforcement agencies.  Accordingly, the 
confidentiality provisions in any Insurance Fraud Unit legislation should focus on ensuring that 
the existing laws are harmonized and that consistent standards apply to the insurance fraud unit.  
MTLA emphasized that the confidentiality provisions should not bar disclosure of closed 
investigative files or reduce the existing litigation discovery rights of policyholders and their 
representatives. 
 
                                                 
17 16 M.R.S.A. § 614; 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2187(6); 25 M.R.S.A. § 2413(1). 
   12
 H. Location and Staffing Needs 
Of the 42 insurance fraud units currently operating, the majority are located within state 
insurance departments.  LD 1285 had proposed housing the Unit within the Bureau and would 
give prosecutorial authority to the Office of Attorney General.   
The Working Group considered staffing needs for a new fraud unit within the Bureau.  
Preliminary staffing estimates for a fully effective unit are: 
 
• Bureau: one Director, six investigators, one forensic accountant, one staff attorney, and 
one clerical support person;  
 
• AG:  one Assistant Attorney General and one detective assigned to the 
Financial Crimes Division, dedicated to the investigation and prosecution 
of insurance fraud; and 
 
• addressing the unmet funding needs of the State Fire Marshal’s Office.  A 
dedicated Insurance Fraud Division will not duplicate the work being done 
by the Fire Marshal’s Office with respect to arson investigations. 
When the Bureau circulated this proposal for comment, the MAIC questioned the affordability 
and urged “a more conservative approach to staffing the unit.”  AIA and PCI, while they have 
emphasized their members’ willingness to pay what is needed for an effective fraud unit, noted 
the need to maintain expenses at a reasonable level and justify the proposed staffing 
requirements.  One insurer in its written comments estimated that the annual cost of the Fraud 
Unit as proposed would be approximately $750,000, and PCI noted that some stakeholder 
comments at the Working Group meetings referenced a range of approximately $400,000 to 
$600,000. 
The proposed staffing reflects the minimum staff the Bureau estimates to be necessary to take on 
this new area of responsibility successfully.  If state agencies are not provided with resources to 
investigate fraud and prosecute effectively, then consumers will continue to be adversely 
affected by fraud.  Experience demonstrates that without adequate resources, an insurance fraud 
unit is destined to fail.   
Background:  While there was consensus that the Bureau of Insurance is the appropriate 
headquarters for a Maine fraud unit, the states we surveyed agreed that the location of the fraud 
unit is less important than having the resources needed to fulfill its mission.  The key elements 
for a successful anti-insurance fraud effort identified through the survey of these states included: 
 
• dedicated investigatory resources,  
• dedicated prosecutorial resources, and  
• the development of working relationships among those involved in the effort. 
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 Most states have dedicated insurance fraud prosecutors within the Attorney General’s offices or 
a similar office, funded through the fraud units.  Investigation and prosecution of insurance 
fraud, however, varied widely from state to state, and the states surveyed indicated that a variety 
of models can be successful: 
 
• In seven states, the Office of the Attorney General oversees the investigation and 
prosecution of insurance fraud.  
 
• In Virginia and Louisiana, insurance fraud is investigated by the state police. 
 
• Massachusetts has an independent insurance fraud bureau that is not connected with any 
government agency. 
 
• In South Carolina, investigations are conducted by the South Carolina Law Enforcement 
Division (SLED), but cases are then prosecuted by the Insurance Fraud Division of the 
Office of Attorney General. 
 
• Pennsylvania has an Insurance Fraud Prevention Authority (IFPA) that is an independent 
government agency. 
 
• Montana has an Enforcement Division that combines market conduct, regulatory 
enforcement, and fraud investigation functions within the Insurance regulators’ 
regulatory functions.  
 
In Georgia and Montana, there are no dedicated insurance fraud prosecutors.  These two states 
rely on local prosecutors who sometimes receive assistance from the Attorney General’s office.  
Representatives from these states stressed the need for relationship-building and education if it is 
necessary to rely on outside resources. 
 
Stakeholder comments:  The State Fire Marshal suggested that the prosecutorial arm of the 
fraud unit be centralized in the Office of the Attorney General, because local district attorneys 
would be unlikely to have sufficient insurance fraud caseloads to support dedicated prosecutorial 
resources.  Working Group members did not express strong opinions about where the 
investigative arm of a fraud unit should be housed.  The important concern is that there must be 
adequate resources for both investigation and prosecution of fraud. 
As noted earlier, the MAIC submitted written comments noting that they “and others have 
always argued for a small beginning to more readily adapt and learn from the growing lessons of 
a new unit,” and expressing concern over “the lack of discussion on actually how the unit would 
be funded.”   
 
Bureau:  As discussed above, the Bureau cannot support legislation to assume new significant 
responsibilities without adequate new funding.  In 2009, Superintendent Kofman opposed LD 
1285 on grounds of inadequate resources.   
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 I. Funding Options 
 
Although some insurer representatives initially proposed funding an insurance fraud unit out of 
the Bureau’s existing budget, the Superintendent explained at the first Working Group meeting 
why this would not be practical, and a consensus developed that some form of insurer assessment 
mechanism would be necessary if a fraud unit were to be established.  AIA reiterated in its 
written comments that its members will be willing to financially support a fraud unit with a 
dedicated funding source as long as the expenses of the entity are reasonable and the cost of its 
operation are shared on a fair and equitable basis, and PCI also expressed strong support for the 
concept.  MAIC, however, could not offer unconditional support, and expressed concern that at 
this time, the concept “has neither costs estimated nor a mechanism to equitably share those 
unknown costs.” 
 
Assessment mechanisms.  The Working Group examined a variety of special assessment 
mechanisms used by other states to fund insurance fraud units.  The bases for assessments 
include per-insured or per-policy assessments, assessments based on premium volume, and flat 
assessments on each insurer.  Variations within each of these types of funding mechanisms are in 
use.  The NAIC has provided the Bureau of Insurance with a summary of assessment 
mechanisms used to fund insurance fraud units, based on a data call to all state insurance fraud 
units (See Appendix D). 
 
Stakeholder comments:  After initially expressing the preference that a fraud unit could be 
financed out of existing resources, insurers recognized that they would have to pay an 
assessment of some type to fund any insurance fraud unit that might be created in Maine.  They 
were concerned about the negative impact of a surcharge on policies, one company paying a 
larger share than others, and the possibility of a retaliatory tax.  While many of the stakeholders 
expressed support for a formula, specific methodology, or flat assessment with a cap, they 
reserved support for a special assessment until details of a specific proposal are known.  The 
MAIC in its written comments was troubled by the lack of specificity, asserting “that the 
industry could not move forward unless there was a clear and accurate way to predict the costs, 
not only of the unit, but to each carrier doing business in the state.” 
 
CAIF emphasized the importance of a funding mechanism that is not limited to investigations, 
but also provides the resources to ensure that cases will be prosecuted.  CAIF expressed 
confidence that this can be done without an undue burden on insurers. 
 
Representative Leslie Fossel expressed concern with the risk that dedicated funding might be 
used to fund other state programs. 
 
In written feedback, one commentator suggested “some mention of awards, fines, and 
settlements intermittently accruing to the Unit.”  This is not how penalties are traditionally 
allocated in Maine, and was not raised by stakeholders as an option in the Working Group.  This 
suggestion raises concern about how reliable this option is for a core revenue source, as 
experience in states that have tried that approach has demonstrated.  Conflict of interest issues 
also need to be considered. 
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Bureau:  Should a fraud unit be established, adequate resources and a funding mechanism from 
the insurance industry would need to be established.   
III. Conclusion  
The Working Group’s discussions have been informative and productive, as evidenced by the 
range of issues where there has been broad agreement.  These discussions involved researching 
and discussing legal and market issues and significant time contributions by the members of the 
working group.  However, two critical issues remain.  The first is whether or not a fraud unit is 
necessary – many stakeholders cited the need for creating a fraud unit.  The other issue that was 
not resolved is funding.  An appropriate and adequate funding mechanism by the insurance 
industry would need to be developed.  Insurance industry stakeholders expressed a willingness to 
continue to work on this issue. 
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 APPENDIX B 
   
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
SUPERINTENDENT MILA KOFMAN 
 
GOOD AFTERNOON AND THANK YOU TO EACH OF YOU FOR COMING 
 
The Joint Standing Committee on Insurance and Financial Services recently 
considered LD 1285 (a bill to create an insurance fraud division within the Bureau 
of insurance), sponsored by Senator Nancy Sullivan. Several issues were raised 
during the committee’s public hearings. Consequently, the Committee asked the 
Bureau to convene a working group of stakeholders, including the Attorney 
General, insurance companies, insurance producers, and others who testified. The 
Committee asked the Bureau to submit a report on findings and recommendations, 
including recommendations for legislation to the committee. This is the first of 
three meetings the working group will have. 
 
I welcome this opportunity. As some of you know, while on faculty at 
Georgetown University, I was the first one in the country to document the third 
cycle of health insurance scams; research that led to a U.S. Senate hearing and a 
GAO report. The experience of serving as an expert witness in criminal 
prosecutions, and having testified in state and federal courts, along with my 
examination of state regulatory efforts, state prosecutions, the role of federal law 
enforcement including the FBI and the U.S. Postal Inspector, U.S. Attorneys 
Offices and the Department of Justice have certainly informed my view on 
insurance fraud. When government fails to protect businesses and individual 
consumers from the criminal element, it is a failure. In fact, I led the effort at the 
NAIC to pass a model law making it a felony to sell phony insurance -- not just a 
misdemeanor but a felony. 
 
Given the nation’s economic downturn, I am especially concerned about increased 
fraudulent activities. We have started to see consumers ripped off by illegal car 
warranties, discount medical cards and phony associations leading consumers to 
believe they are buying real health insurance. 
 
Fraud and scams increase when the economy tanks. We all know that. While I 
expect insurers to be concerned about fraud on them -- a real concern -- I’m 
concerned about fraud on consumers by scammers -- also a very real concern. 
 
My goal is to have an open and honest discussion of the issues. My intent is to 
address the issues in a holistic way – looking at fraud prevention, mitigation, and 
deterrence. We will discuss effective investigations that lead to effective  
prosecutions; we will look at the courts and response to white collar crimes. We 
will have to address the very real issue of resources both at the Bureau of 
Insurance, the Attorney General’s Office, the Fire Marshal’s office and other state 
agencies involved in investigating and/or prosecuting insurance fraud. 
 
So welcome to this working group. I am optimistic that the different perspectives 
and the substantive challenges will be addressed in a holistic, comprehensive, and 
balanced way. 
 
I would like to thank Senator Nancy Sullivan for her long commitment and 
leadership on this issue, seeking to address insurance fraud issues through 
legislation. In fact the Bureau studied this issue and reported to the legislature in 
2005. 
 
I would like to thank Senator Bowman, Representative Treat, and the members of 
the IFS Committee and the Committee’s legislative analyst Colleen McCarthy 
Reid for their work on this issue. Today, Rep. Fossel is here to help with this effort 
and I appreciate his commitment to this very important issue. 
 
I would like to give our legislators an opportunity to introduce themselves, and 
then I would like to go around the room and have each one of you state your name 
and affiliation. I will now turn this over to Deputy Superintendent Tim Schott, 
who, as some of you know, is a former prosecutor. I have asked Tim to lead this 
effort on behalf of the Bureau. 
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From Coalition Against Insurance Fraud Website, www.insurancefraud.org/stats.htm.  
 
Go figure: fraud data  
Measuring insurance fraud is an elusive target. No single national agency gathers omnibus fraud 
statistics. Insurance fraud data thus are relatively piecemeal, making our understanding of 
insurance fraud an ongoing work in progress. 
Insurance companies and diverse state and federal agencies each gather fraud data related to their 
own missions. But the kind, quality and volume of data they compile vary widely.  
Independent watchdogs, academics, insurance industry groups and other organizations also conduct 
research on a variety of fraud topics. Some is national in scope, and some is state-specific.  
 
State insurance fraud bureaus  
Fraud bureaus are state agencies charged with investigating suspected insurance schemes within 
their states. Most states have fraud bureaus, which investigate suspected schemes across most line 
of insurance. States without multi-line fraud bureaus include: Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, 
Michigan, Oregon, Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming.  
The 2007 annual study of state fraud bureaus by the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud reveals this 
2007 combined profile.  
Budget   $147,738,214 
Employees   1,694 
Referrals   115,062 
Cases opened   31,654 
Arrests   4,848 
Presentations to prosecutors   5,936 
Convictions   4,228 
Civil actions   7,672 
Restitution ordered   $179,036,100 
 
Cases reported by the news media so far in 2009.  
By type of fraud  
  
Auto insurance  
Auto bodily injury claims: Staged-accident rings fleece auto insurers out of billions of dollars a 
year by billing for unnecessary treatment of phantom injuries. Usually these are bogus soft-tissue 
injuries such as sore backs or whiplash, which are difficult to medically dispute.  
Fraudulent and abusive auto-injury claims are a costly problem. Fraud and “buildup”* added $4.8 
billion to $6.8 billion in excess payments to auto injury claims in 2007. That means 13-percent to 
18-percent increases in payments under private-passenger auto policies from 2002. (Insurance 
Research Council, Nov. 2008) 
Bogus and abusive claims also are rising. They ranged between $4.3 billion and 5.8 billion in 2002, 
or between 11 percent and15 percent of total payments. (ibid) 
Claims with apparent fraud or buildup were more likely than other claims to involve sprain and 
strain injuries, and periods of disability. These claimants also were more likely to receive treatment 
from physical therapists, chiropractors and other alternative medical providers. (ibid)  
Buildup involves treatment that’s excessive but isn’t deliberately or criminally fraudulent.  
  
Underwriting fraud : Dishonest drivers try to lower auto premiums by dishonestly lying on their 
insurance application or renewal. Among the ruses: registering their vehicles in locales where 
premiums are lower; low-balling their stated mileage; and saying a commercial vehicle is used 
mainly for personal use.  
1. Auto insurers lost $16.1 billion due to premium rating errors in private-passenger 
premiums in 2007. Premium rating errors account for 10 percent of the $166 billion 
in personal auto premiums. Fraud accounts for a portion of these losses. Some 
drivers will seek to lower their premiums by schemes such as deliberately 
misrepresenting mileage driven, how the vehicle is used and where it’s registered. 
(Quality Planning Corporation, 2008)  
Staged Accidents 
An effective strategy against staged-accident rings involves creating multi-agency task forces to 
apply highly focused pressure in targeted locales where the fraud rings operate. The goal is to 
thwart often-massive fake injury claims by bogus crash victims. Massachusetts, for example, has 
experienced considerable success with task forces in recent years... 
Nearly 1,200 people in 13 communities have been arrested for suspected involvement in staged 
crashes since Massachusetts began clamping down on widespread accident rings in late 2003. Many 
have been convicted. Fraud fighters phased in multi-agency task forces in 13 communities amid 
public outcry after 65-year-old grandmother Altagracia Arias died in a setup crash in September 
2003. (Community Fraud Initiative, A Five-Year Retrospective; Automobile Insurers Bureau of 
Massachusetts and Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts, 2009) 
The number of injuries per 100 accidents has dropped in those communities, from 38 injuries per 
100 accidents in 2003 to 26 in 2008. The statewide average dropped from 38 injuries per 100 
accidents to 26 over the last five years. (ibid) 
Drivers in the 13 targeted communities have saved nearly $252 million in lower premiums total over 
the four years between 2005 and 2008. Statewide, the savings was $514 million. (ibid) 
 
Workers compensation  
Some businesses illegally try to avoid paying full state-required workers compensation premiums. 
One scheme involves paying workers off the books because the number of employees is a factor in 
determining a business’s premiums. Another scheme involves misclassifying employees in high-risk 
jobs as holding lower-risk jobs.  
1. At least 50,000 construction workers in New York City — one of four —are paid off the 
books or misclassified as independent contractors. (Fiscal Policy Institute, 2007)  
1. Those schemes stole $489 million in workers compensation premiums, taxes and other 
expenses in 2005. That figure could reach $557 million in 2008. (ibid)  
1. More than 39,500 employers misclassify 704,785 workers — or 10.3 percent of the 
workforce — throughout New York State each year. (Linda H. Donahue, James Ryan 
Lamare, and Fred B. Kotler,Cornell University, 2007)  
1. In construction, 45,474 workers — or 14.8 percent of New York’s workforce — are 
misclassified as independent contractors. (ibid)  
1. Employers in high-risk California industries may hide up to 75 percent of their payroll — or 
$100 billion — for the most-dangerous jobs. This forces honest employers to pay workers 
comp premiums as much as eight times higher than if everyone paid their fair share. (Frank 
Neuhauser and Colleen Donovan, University of California-Berkeley, 2007)  
1. Every $1 invested in workers compensation anti-fraud efforts has returned $6.17, or 
$260.3 million total in 2006-2007. (California Insurance Department, 2007 annual report)  
1. Workers comp insurers in Massachusetts lose $100 million a year in unpaid premiums to 
businesses that illegally pay workers cash under the table or falsely label employees as 
independent contractors. (Social and Economic Costs of Employee Misclassification in 
Construction, Harvard University, December 2004)  
1. As many as one of seven construction workers in Massachusetts is hired off the books or 
illegally classified as independent workers. (ibid)  
 
Consumer attitudes  
Consumer tolerance of insurance fraud remains relatively high, public-opinion polls have 
consistently shown in recent years. The coalition’s study is the newest national research into what 
people think about this crime.  
1. One of five U.S. adults — about 45 million people — say it’s acceptable to defraud insurance 
companies under certain circumstances. Four of five adults think insurance fraud is 
unethical. (Four Faces of Insurance Fraud, Coalition Against Insurance Fraud, 2008)  
1. Nearly one of four Americans says it’s ok to defraud insurers (8 percent say it’s “quite 
acceptable” to bilk insurers, and 16 percent say it’s “somewhat acceptable.”) (Accenture 
Ltd., 2003)  
1. About one in 10 people agree it’s ok to submit claims for items that aren’t lost or damaged, 
or for personal injuries that didn’t occur. Two of five people are “not very likely” or “not 
likely at all” to report someone who defrauded an insurer. (ibid)  
Consumer tolerance of specific insurance schemes has increased over the last 10 years, reveals the 
Four Faces study. There is a decline in the number of Americans who think it’s unethical to: 
1. misrepresent facts on an insurance application to lower their premiums (82 percent today, 
down from 91 percent in 1997);  
1. file a claim for damage that occurred before the damage was covered (85 percent, down 
from 91 percent);  
1. inflate a claim to cover the deductible (84 percent, down from 91 percent); and  
1. misrepresent an incident in order to be paid for an uncovered loss (84 percent, down from 
92 percent).  
Consumer attitudes toward insurance providers also have declined over the last 10 years, according 
to Four Faces:  
1. 62 percent of people have a positive attitude about insurance companies (down from 72 
percent in 1997); and  
1. Fewer than two of five adults feel positively about the insurance industry as a whole (down 
from slightly more than 50 percent).  
 
Health insurance  
In general 
The U.S. spends more than $2 trillion on healthcare annually. At least 3 percent of that 
spending — or $68 billion — is lost to fraud each year. (National Health Care Anti-Fraud 
Association, 2008)  
More than $2.4 billion in recoveries for fraud, waste and abuse in federal healthcare 
programs are expected for the first half of FY 2009 (October 2008 through March 2009). 
Some 1,415 individuals and organizations also were excluded from federal programs for 
fraud abuse; 293 criminal actions were brought, as were 243 civil actions. (Semiannual 
Report to Congress, Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human 
Services, Office, 2009)  
Private health insurance  
1. Every $2 million invested in fighting health-care fraud returns $17.3 million in recoveries, 
court-ordered judgments, plus bogus claims that weren’t paid and other anti-fraud savings. 
(National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, 2008)  
1. The average health insurer’s anti-fraud investigative unit has an annual budget of slightly 
more than $1.9 million and 19 fulltime employees. (ibid)  
1. The average health insurer has 363 open cases in 2007, and each insurer investigation unit 
handled an average of 791 cases total for 2007. (ibid)  
1. More than seven of 10 insurer investigative units use fraud-detection software. (ibid)  
 
Drug diversion  
Insurance fraud is a major financier of America’s epidemic diversion of addictive prescription drugs 
such as OxyContin, according to Prescription for Peril, a December 2007 report by the Coalition 
Against Insurance Fraud.  
1. Drug diversion costs health insurers up to $72.5 billion a year in bogus claims involving 
opioid abuse alone;  
1. Private health insurers lose up to $24.9 billion annually;  
1. Diversion costs individual private insurance plans up to $857 million annually;  
1. Nearly half of Aetna’s member/pharmacy anti-fraud team’s caseload involved prescription 
benefits in 2006;  
1. Expenses of suspected doctor-shopping members of Medco Health Solutions were nearly 
seven times higher than the monthly cost of members without excessive prescription 
claims; and  
1. Abuse suspects incurred $41 in claims for office visits and outpatient treatment for every $1 
in narcotic prescription claims against WellPoint.  
 
Whistleblower Lawsuits 
The federal False Claims Act allows whistleblowers to obtain a portion of any federal civil recoveries 
stemming from the whistleblower’s efforts to expose fraud against programs. Whistleblowers 
account for a major portion of healthcare convictions because they tend to be insiders at the 
offending healthcare organizations, and thus have unique access to information needed to charge 
and convict.  
1. $1.55 billion in civil settlements and judgments from 218 cases in 2007 in which the 
Department of Health and Human Service was the primary client agency.  (U.S. 
Department of Justice)  
1. $13.2 billion in total civil settlements from 3,665 cases from 1987 through 2007. (ibid)  
1. Whistleblowers received an average of 16.84 percent of recoveries when the federal 
government intervened. (Taxpayers Against Insurance Fraud, 2008)  
1. The federal government recovers $15 for every $1 invested in False Claims Act health-care 
investigations and prosecutions. (Taxpayers Against Fraud, 2008)  
 
Medicare Fraud  
1. Medicare’s annual anti-fraud budget is $465 billion. (Miami Herald, August 11, 2008)  
1. Medicare and Medicaid made an estimated $23.7 billion in improper payments in 2007.  
These included $10.8 billion for Medicare and $12.9 billion for Medicaid.  Medicare’s fee-for-
service reduced its error rate from 4.4 percent to 3.9 percent. (U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget, 2008)  
1. Medicare and Medicaid lose an estimated $60 billion or more annually to fraud, including 
$2.5 billion in South Florida. (Miami Herald, August 11, 2008)  
1. Every $1 spent on Medicare fraud prevention would stop $10 in fraud. (U.S.Department of 
Health and Human Services) (Miami Herald)  
1. Medicare spends less than 0.2 cents of every $1 of its $456 billion annual budget combating 
fraud, waste and abuse. (Miami Herald, August 11, 2008)  
1. Medicare paid dead physicians 478,500 claims totaling up to $92 million from 2000 to 2007. 
These claims included 16,548 to 18,240 deceased physicians. (U.S. Senate Permanent 
Committee on Investigations, 2008)  
1. Nearly one of three claims (29 percent) Medicare paid for durable medical equipment was 
erroneous in FY 2006. (Inspector General report, Department of Health and Human 
Services, August 2008)  
1. Medicare and private health insurers pay up to $16 billion a year for needless imaging tests 
ordered by doctors. (American College of Radiology, 2004)  
  
Other Medicare Stats  
Medicare paid more than $1 billion in questionable claims for 18 categories of medical 
supplies for patients that don’t appear to need. The study covered claims between January 
2001 and December 2006. The claims included walkers for patients with purported sinus 
congestion, paraplegia or shoulder injuries. Hundreds of thousands of claims were made for 
diabetes-related glucose test strips for patients with purported breathing problems, bubonic 
plague, leprosy or sexual impotence. (U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2008)  
Medicaid Fraud 
1. The 50 state Medicaid fraud control units obtained a collective 1,205 convictions, and 
claimed total recoveries of more than $1.1 billion in court-ordered restitution, fines, civil 
settlements, and penalties in FY 2007. (annual report, Office of Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services)  
1. Of the 3,308 persons and entities excluded from participation in Medicare, Medicaid and 
other federal health care programs in FY 2007, 805 were based on referrals made by state 
Medicaid fraud control units. (ibid)  
1. The number of successful civil actions totaled 607. (ibid) 
2. More than 61 percent of medical providers (4,319 total) banned from state Medicaid 
programs in 2004 and 2005 didn’t show up in the federal database of state-banned 
providers. This makes it easier for banned providers to set up shop in other states and 
continue doing business with federal health-insurance programs. (Office of Inspector 
General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008)  
FBI Enforcement (FY 2007) 
The FBI investigates persons and organizations that defraud public and private health-insurance 
programs. The FBI combats fraud and abuse jointly with other federal, state, and local law-
enforcement agencies, plus the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service, private health insurers 
and other organizations. 
1. 2,493 health-fraud cases investigated, resulting in 839 indictments and 635 convictions. 
Other cases also are pending plea agreements and trials. (FBI Financial Crimes Report to 
the Public, FY 2007)  
1. $1.12 billion in court-ordered restitution, $4.4 million in recoveries, $34 million in fines, and 
308 seizures valued at $61.2 million. (ibid)  
Medical Identity Theft 
1. Medical identity theft is the fastest-growing form of identity theft. (World Privacy Forum, 
2006)  
1. Between 250,000 and 500,000 Americans have been victimized by medical identity theft. 
(World Privacy Forum, 2006)  
1. Medical identity theft comprises about 3 percent (249,000) of 8.3 million overall victims of 
identity theft. (Federal Trade Commission, Identity Theft Survey Report, 2007)  
1. Nine million adult Americans (4 percent) believe they or a family member has been 
victimized by medical identity theft. Just under half (47 percent) believe computerized 
health records are stolen most often. (Harris Interactive, 2008)  
1. 75 percent of Americans age 18-49 and 78 percent of Americans age 50-plus are concerned 
about being victims of identity theft in general. 25 percent of Americans aged 18-49 aren’t 
concerned and 22 percent of Americans age 50-plus aren’t concerned. (AARP public opinion 
poll, 2008)  
1. 36 percent of Americans age 18-49 and 43 percent of Americans age 50-plus carry their 
Social Security card in their wallet. (ibid)  
1. 40 percent of Americans age 18-49 carry and 57 percent of Americans age 50-plus carry 
their insurance or Medicare card in their wallet with an ID number that is their or their 
spouse’s ID number. (ibid)  
IRS enforcement  
The IRS combats criminal tax and money laundering violations involving insurance claims and fraud 
against insurance companies. Agent/broker premium diversion and re-insurance fraud are among 
the internal fraud schemes. Phony insurance companies, offshore/unlicensed Internet insurers and 
staged auto accidents are among the external fraud schemes. 
1. 30 insurance-fraud investigations initiated  
2. 21 prosecutions recommended  
3. 21 indictments  
4. 12 sentenced  
5. 83.3 percent incarceration  
6. 19-month average to serve  
 
Slip & fall injuries  
Swindlers will pretend to slip or trip and injure themselves to fraudulently collect insurance 
settlements or other payouts. Often the swindlers threaten an expensive lawsuit to extort fast 
payouts. Businesses are frequent targets.  
1. Three percent of slip-and-fall injuries are fraudulent. (National Floor Safety Institute)  
1. Bogus injury claims and related costs such as litigation amount to nearly $2 billion a year. 
(ibid)  
 
ANTI-FRAUD LEGISLATION  
Insurance fraud is a specific crime in every state except Alabama, Oregon and Virginia.  
 
Employment & education  
1. Employment of insurance fraud investigators, claims adjusters, appraisers and examiners, 
is expected to grow by 9 percent from 2006 to 20016. This growth is consistent with the 
average for all occupations. (U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, 
2008-09 edition)  
1. The education of fraud investigators, adjusters, appraisers and examiners is divided as 
follows:  
— High school or less: 22 percent 
— Some college, no degree: 17 percent 
— Associate’s degree: 12 percent  
— Bachelor’s degree: 45 percent 
— Graduate degree: 5 percent.  
(ibid)  
 
Older statistics  
People's Attitudes About Fraud 
Consumers 
Nearly one of four Americans say it’s ok to defraud insurers, says a survey by the consulting firm 
Accenture Ltd. Some 8 percent say it’s “quite acceptable” to bilk insurers, while 16 percent say it’s 
“somewhat acceptable.” About one in 10 people agree it’s ok to submit claims for items that aren’t 
lost or damaged, or for personal injuries that didn’t occur. Two of five people are “not very likely” or 
“not likely at all” to report someone who ripped of an insurer. Click here for the complete study. 
Accenture Ltd. (2003)  
 
Nearly one of 10 Americans would commit insurance fraud if they knew they could get away with it. 
Nearly three of 10 Americans (29 percent) wouldn't report insurance scams committed by someone 
they know. Progressive Insurance (2001) 
 
More than one of three Americans say it's ok to exaggerate insurance claims to make up for the 
deductible (40 percent in 1997). Insurance Research Council (2000) 
 
One of four Americans says it's ok to pad a claim to make up for premiums they've already paid. 
Insurance Research Council (2000)  
 
One of three Americans says it's ok for employees to stay off work and receive workers 
compensation benefits because they feel pain, even though their doctor says it's ok to return to 
work. Insurance Research Council (1999) 
 
Seven of 10 Americans say workers comp fraud is a widespread problem, and 45 percent say fraud 
is increasing. Insurance Research Council (1999) 
 
One of five employed workers says they've been aware of fraud in their workplace. Insurance 
Research Council (1999) 
 
Four of five Pennsylvanians reviewed their medical bills for accuracy in 1999 (seven of 10 in 1997). 
Insurance Fraud Prevention Authority of Pennsylvania (1999) 
 
Nearly 16 percent of Pennsylvanians say they're willing to receive bogus workers comp payments 
(25 percent in 1997). Insurance Fraud Prevention Authority of Pennsylvania (1999) 
 
Three of four Americans aren't willing to pay more for their auto coverage to allow bad-faith third-
party lawsuits. Insurance Research Council (2000) 
Physicians 
Nearly one of three physicians say it's necessary to game the health care system to provide high 
quality medical care. Journal of the American Medical Association (2000) 
More than one of three physicians says patients have asked physicians to deceive third-party payers 
to help the patients obtain coverage for medical services in the last year. Journal of the American 
Medical Association (2000)  
One of 10 physicians has reported medical signs or symptoms a patient didn't have in order to help 
the patient secure coverage for needed treatment or services in the last year. Journal of the 
American Medical Association (2000) 
 
Fraud Losses & Costs 
Personal Injury Protection (PIP)  
More than one of every three bodily-injury claims from car crashes involve fraud. Insurance 
Research Council (1996) 
17-20 cents of every dollar paid for bodily injury claims from auto policies involves fraud or claim 
buildup. Insurance Research Council (1996). 
Fraud adds $5.2-$6.3 billion to the auto premiums that policyholders pay each year. Insurance 
Research Council (1996) 
Claims for bodily injuries under the Personal Injury Protection portion of New York's no-fault auto 
coverage rose 79 percent between 1999 and 2000, compared to 25 percent in all no-fault states. 
Insurance Research Council (2001) 
Insurers increased auto premiums up to 25 percent for New York City in 2001. Insurance 
Information Institute (2001) 
The average PIP claim is $7,950 in New York State — 47 percent higher than the national average. 
Insurance Information Institute (2001) 
Fraud costs each insured driver in New York State $75-$115 per year. Insurance Information 
Institute (2001) 
PIP claims in New York State rose nearly one third in 2000, more than twice as fast as second-place 
Florida. Insurance Information Institute (2001) 
The average PIP claim in New York State jumped 19 percent over the first nine months of 2000, and 
64 percent between 1995 and 3Q 2000. This compares to a 33-percent increase for other states. 
Insurance Information Institute (2001) 
Auto insurers in New York pay out nearly twice as much in PIP claims as they collect in premiums. 
For every $100 auto insurers received, they paid $177 in claims through 3Q 2000. Insurance 
Information Institute (2001) 
 
 
 
Arson 
Arson and suspected arson account for nearly 500,000 fires a year, or one of every four fires in the 
U.S. National Fire Protection Association (1998) 
Only 2 percent of arson or suspect arson fires result in convictions. National Fire Protection 
Association (1998) 
Arson and suspected arson are the largest causes of property damage in the U.S. National Fire 
Protection Association (1998) 
 
 
 
Anti-Fraud Efforts 
State Fraud Bureaus (2001-2002) 
Criminal convictions increased 31 percent. Coalition Against Insurance Fraud (2004) 
Cases presented for prosecution rose 14 percent. Coalition Against Insurance Fraud (2004) 
Investigations initiated increased by nearly 18 percent. Coalition Against Insurance Fraud (2004) 
Referrals of suspected fraudulent actions were up 4.5 percent. Coalition Against Insurance Fraud 
(2004) 
 
 
 
Property-casualty insurers 
Fraud is a serious problem, half of all property-casualty insurers say. Insurance Research Council-
Insurance Services Office (2002) 
 
The amount of fraud their company has experienced has increased over the last three years, more 
than one of three insurers say. Nearly half say fraud has stayed the same. Insurance Research 
Council-Insurance Services Office (2002) 
About 11-30 cents — or more — of every claim dollar is lost to "soft" fraud (smalltime cheating by 
normally honest people), nearly half of property-casualty insurance companies say. Hardcore scams 
steal only a small fraction of that money. Insurance Research Council-Insurance Services Office 
(2002) 
 
Only one of four insurers thoroughly investigate cheating on insurance applications. Even fewer 
insurers investigate insiders such as employees and agents who commit premium fraud. Research 
Council-Insurance Services Office (2002) 
 
More than two of five property-casualty insurers have increased spending to fight fraud over the last 
three years. More than four of five insurers have formal anti-fraud programs. Insurance Research 
Council-Insurance Services Office (2002) 
Nearly three of five insurers say their efforts to combat are only moderately effective, or lower. 
Research Council-Insurance Services Office (2002Fraud-control spending by property-casualty 
insurers rose from $200 million in 1992 to $650 million in 1996. Insurance Research Council (1997) 
98 percent of property-casualty insurers have a fraud-control program, and most insurers have 
special investigation units. Insurance Research Council (1997) 
Half of property-casualty insurers have broad, public-information programs directed against fraud. 
Insurance Research Council (1997) 
 
 
 
Workers Compensation 
Without workers compensation anti-fraud laws, claims would've been 10.4 percent higher in 1997, 
the average claim would've been 7.3 percent larger and system costs per worker would've been 
18.5 percent higher. National Council on Compensation Insurance (1999) 
 
  
Healthcare 
In 1996, Congress funded an added $548 million over seven years for health-care fraud 
enforcement. FBI (2001) 
Health insurers save $11 for every $1 they spend fighting fraud – an average of $5.5 million per 
company in 1998. Health Insurance Association of America (1999).  
Federal convictions for health fraud, waste and abuse rose 57 percent between 1999 and 1998. U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (2000) 
More than nine of 10 health insurers (95 percent) have anti-fraud training for employees, and 
nearly three of five (56 percent) have fraud hotlines. Health Insurance Association of America 
(1999) 
The FBI secured 560 convictions for healthcare fraud in 2001, a four-fold increase from 1992. The 
bureau also racked up 741 indictments in 2000, up from 615 in 1999. FBI (2001) 
Medicare lost $11.9 billion to waste, fraud and mistakes in 2000, half of what was lost five years 
ago from improper payments to doctors and hospitals. U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (2001) 
Fraud amounts to 10 percent of U.S. healthcare expenditures. Government Accounting Office 
(1992), National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (2001) 
Seniors and other taxpayers pay up to $1 billion a year in inflated drug prices due to potential fraud 
and loopholes in Medicare. The overpayments represented 1/5 of Medicare spending in 2000. 
Government Accounting Office (2001) 
80 percent of healthcare fraud is by medical providers, 10 percent is by consumers and the balance 
is by other sources. Health Insurance Association of America (1998) 
The U.S. government recovered more than $8 for every dollar spent fighting health care fraud and 
abuse by using the False Claims Act. New Directions for Policy (2001) 
 
 
 
Identity Theft 
Thieves stole the identities of 700,000 Americans last year. The Privacy Clearinghouse (2000) 
Identity theft in general cost $745 million in 1997, up from $450 million in 1996. U.S. Secret 
Service (1998) 
Abuse of Social Security numbers nearly tripled between 1998 and 1999, and four of every five calls 
to the Social Security Administration's fraud hotline involve identity theft. Social Security 
Administration (1999) 
 
 
 APPENDIX D 
   
Information received in response to a August 2009 NAIC data call to all states at the request
of the Maine Bureau of Insurance that asked the following questions:
1) Does your Insurance Fraud Bureau or Unit receive funding from an assessment?          
If Yes:   STATE: 
            Answer:
2) Does your Department receive an assessment intended ONLY for your Fraud Bureau/Unit? 
3) What is the assessment based on and how much is the assessment? 
4) Please provide citation to the directive or statute that requires the assessment. 
State 
Does the Insurance Fraud Unit/Bureau receive 
funding from an assessment?
Does the Dept. receive an assessment 
intended ONLY for the Fraud/Bureau 
Unit? 
What is assessment based on? How much is 
the assessment? Assessment Statute or Citation
Alaska No
No. Funding is provided through general 
appropriation. Assessment not only for Fraud Bureau. N/A
Arizona Yes Yes, only for the Fraud Unit
The assessment is based on the amount of monies 
used at the end of each fiscal year for the fraud unit 
and for the prosecution of fraud. Can assess an 
insurer up to $1,050 a year. Arizona Revised Statute 20-466.J
California Yes Yes, with exceptions
1872.86 CIC - General Assessment on all licensed 
carriers up to $5,100 per carrier (all goes to fraud 
unit). 1872.86 CIC - General Assessment
1872.8 CIC - Auto Fraud, $1 per insured vehicle 
(split between fraud unit, district attorneys and 
CHP as determined by statute). 1872.8 CIC - Auto Fraud
1872.83 CIC - Workers' Compensation Fraud, as 
determined by Fraud Assessment Commission 
(Gov. appointees) who make an annual 
determination on employers (both self-insured and 
employers covered by an insurance policy)
1872.83 CIC - Workers' Compensation 
Fraud
$.10 (ten cent) assessment on each insured under 
and individual or group policy (split between Fraud 
Division and local district attorneys as determined 
by statute).
1872.85 CIC - Disability and Healthcare 
Fraud
$.50 (50 cent) assessment on each insured vehicle 
to combat organized auto fraud
(split between Fraud Division, local district 
attorneys, and CHP, as determined by statute). 
Between 3 and 10 grants available. 1874.8 CIC - Organized Auto Fraud
$1 per each individual life policy and each 
individual annuity product with a value of $15,000 
or more (split between the Investigation Division 
and local district attorneys, as determined by 
statute).
10127.17 CIC - Life and Annuity 
Consumer Protection Program
NAIC DATA CALL REGARDING STATE FRAUD UNIT ASSESSMENTS - SURVEY RESULTS
State 
Does the Insurance Fraud Unit/Bureau receive 
funding from an assessment?
Does the Dept. receive an assessment 
intended ONLY for the Fraud/Bureau 
Unit? 
What is assessment based on? How much is 
the assessment? Assessment Statute or Citation
Delaware
Yes. Special revolving fund to be designated as the Delaware 
Insurance Fraud Auxiliary Fund.
No. The cost of the administration and 
operation of the DE Insurance Fraud 
Prevention Bureau shall be borne by all 
insurance companies authorized to transact 
insurance in DE. 
An assessment of $550 annually paid by each 
insurer. Title 18, Section 2415; 2404 (d)
DC No No 
Insurance Trust Fund that funds the entire Insurance 
Department operation and also by general assessment of 
regulated insurers by policy and premium tax.
Insurance Fraud Bureau is admin overhead 
expense and comes out of overall budget. No 
separate Fraud Bureau budget. Expense is 
factored into Insurance Department budget. None None
Georgia Yes, as authorized by the State General Assembly.
Yes. The amount is based on operational 
budgets of prior years which include personal 
services, travel, expenditures, etc. The fees 
are assessed by category of insurers and 
premium paid. The current fiscal year the 
special fraud fund was $3.2 million in 
assessments.
On July 1, the Commissioner shall assess each 
insurance company doing business in GA on the 
following basis: (a) Each insurer with written 
premium < $1,000,000.00, including those insurers 
whose GA written premium is 0 or less than 0, will 
each be assessed a fixed amount not more than the 
minimum amount assessed an insurer with Georgia 
written premium of $1,000,000.00 or more; (b) 
Each insurer with written premium is > 
$40,000,000.00, but < $100,000,000.00, an 
assessment equal to .0045 times the appropriated 
amount; (c) Each insurer with written premium of  
$100,000,000.00 or more, an assessment equal to 
.0075 times the appropriated amount; and (d) Each 
insurer not included in (a), (b), or (c) above, an 
assessment shall be computed on a prorata basis of 
the remainder of the appropriation for each insurer 
whose written premium is > $1,000,000.00 but < 
$40,000,000.00; (e) Written premium is premiums 
written in GA ONLY, including annuity 
considerations and is determined prior to 
reinsurance transactions. Written premium is 
determined from the most recent annual statement. 
120-2-72-.05 Participation in Fund; 
O.C.G.A. § 33-1-17.
Idaho  No Insurance Fraud Unit
Iowa No No N/A N/A
Kansas No No
As line item in the agency budget. The Agency is funded through premium taxes.
Kentucky No
No. The Fraud Division does not receive an 
assessment. Funded through Agency Funds.
State 
Does the Insurance Fraud Unit/Bureau receive 
funding from an assessment?
Does the Dept. receive an assessment 
intended ONLY for the Fraud/Bureau 
Unit? 
What is assessment based on? How much is 
the assessment? Assessment Statute or Citation
Louisiana Yes Yes
The assessment is calculated on the direct 
premiums received by each insurer licensed to 
conduct business in LA, with some exceptions. The 
total fee is any year cannot exceed an amount equal 
to .0.000375 times the annual direct premium 
dollars received that are subject to the fee. LDOI is 
given the first $30,000 for operating costs for 
assessing collecting and distributing the fee. This 
remaining amount is then divided among LA State 
Police (75%) LA Department of Justice (15%), 
And LA Fraud Units (10%) which works closely 
together as a Fraud Task Force. The total 
assessment for the FY 08/09 was nearly $3.6 
million, of which LDOI received $394,894. LSA-R.S. 40:1428
Maryland No (used to, but not anymore) No
Massachusetts Yes, the Bureau is independent from DOI Yes
All costs of administration and operation of the 
insurance fraud bureau shall be paid
as follows: one-half by the members of the 
Automobile Insurers Bureau, or its successor rating 
organization licensed under section 8 of chapter 
175A of the General Laws and the companies 
authorized to write private or commercial 
automobile insurance that are not members of the 
licensed rating organization, apportioned on the 
basis of the direct written premium of each 
company in the most recent calendar year; and one-
half by the members of the Workers’ 
Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau, or its 
successor organization licensed under section 52C 
of chapter 152 of the General Laws, and the 
companies authorized to write workers’ 
compensation insurance that are not members of 
the licensed rating organization, apportioned on the 
basis of the direct written premium of each 
company in the most recent calendar year. The 
executive director shall determine the estimated 
costs for the operation of the insurance fraud 
bureau and upon Bureau approval shall assess the 
licensed rating organizations and the other nonmember companies in accordance with this section. The estimated costs shall be paid to the executive director and he shall subsequently make adjustments to future assessments. FY 08/09 assessments were: $438,506 for investigation and prosecution of auto insurance fraud and $284,456 for the investigation and prosecution of workers' compensation fraud.
Enabling statute: St. 1990, c.338; St. 1991, 
c.398, §99; St. 1996, c.427, §13; and St. 
2002, c.279, §5; and AG funding: Section 
3 of H 6412 Chapter 399.
Michigan No Fraud Bureau; therefore no assessment.
State 
Does the Insurance Fraud Unit/Bureau receive 
funding from an assessment?
Does the Dept. receive an assessment 
intended ONLY for the Fraud/Bureau 
Unit? 
What is assessment based on? How much is 
the assessment? Assessment Statute or Citation
Mississippi No
The Insurance Integrity Enforcement Bureau 
was created by Miss. Code Ann. 7-5-303.  
The driving force behind the legislation and 
most of the funding came from the Workers' 
Compensation Commission.  The IFU is 
located at the Mississippi Attorney General's 
Office.  Our office has concurrent 
jurisdiction with district attorneys in 
Mississippi's 82 counties to prosecute 
insurance fraud; in practice, most local 
prosecutors are not well equipped for long-
term, document intensive white collar 
investigations and prosecutions.
Each carrier and self-insurer shall be assessed 
$250.00. § 71-3-99
Miss Code Ann. 7.5.303; 7.5.305 Funding; 
formula; § 71-3-99
Nebraska Yes 
Yes, for the Insurance Fraud Prevention 
Division.
Any insurer doing business in the state is assessed 
an amount determined by the Director not to 
exceed $200 a year. Self insured's not only exceed 
$1,000 per year; however, there is a reciprocal 
agreement among states. Sections 44-6601 through 44.6606. 
Nevada Yes. 
Yes. 15% is retained in Division, 85% goes 
to Attorney General where the Fraud Unit is 
located.
The annual amount assessed on each reinsurer that 
has the authority to assume only reinsurance must 
not exceed $500. For all other insurers subject to 
the annual assessment, the annual amount so 
assessed to each insurer: (a) Must not exceed $500, 
if the total amount of the premiums charged to 
insureds in this State by the insurer is < $100,000; 
(b) Must not exceed $750, if the total amount of 
the premiums charged to insureds in this State by 
the insurer is $100,000 or more, but < $1,000,000; 
(c) Must not exceed $1,000, if the total amount of 
the premiums charged to insureds in this State by 
the insurer is $1,000,000 or more, but < 
$10,000,000; (d) Must not exceed $1,500, if the 
total amount of the premiums charged to insureds 
in this State by the insurer is $10,000,000 or more, 
but < $50,000,000; and (e) Must not exceed 
$2,000, if the total amount of the premiums 
charged to insureds in this State by the insurer is 
$50,000,000 or more. 6.  The provisions of this 
section do not apply to an insurer who provides 
only workers' compensation insurance and pays the assessment provided in NRS 232.680.N.R.S. 679B.700.
State 
Does the Insurance Fraud Unit/Bureau receive 
funding from an assessment?
Does the Dept. receive an assessment 
intended ONLY for the Fraud/Bureau 
Unit? 
What is assessment based on? How much is 
the assessment? Assessment Statute or Citation
New Hampshire Yes
No. The Insurance Department is funded 
through assessment from which the Fraud 
Unit receives its working capital. 
The assessment is intended to fund the activities of 
the Department, which includes the Fraud Unit's 
activities. R.S.A. 400-A:39
New Mexico Yes Yes
The rate of assessment not less than two hundred 
dollars ($200) and not exceeding one-tenth of one 
percent of the correctly reported gross written 
premiums on policies written in NM by the 
authorized insurers. In calculating the gross direct 
written premiums for an insurer, all gross direct 
written premiums for workers' compensation shall 
be excluded from the calculation. NM. Stat. Ann 59A-16C-14
North Carolina No
Oklahoma Yes
Yes, with exceptions. 75% of assessment 
remains with insurance department, 25% is 
transferred to Attorney General Insurance 
Fraud Unit revolving fund for the Attorney 
General in the investigation and prosecution 
of insurance fraud. Flat Fee of $750 per insurer. 36 O.S. Sec 362
Pennsylvania
Yes. Receive grant funding from the Insurance Fraud 
Authority (IFPA) that is funded by an assessment on the 
industry (40 O.S. 325.21)
Yes, the funding from the grant is solely used 
for the Anti Fraud Compliance Division. 
Assessment is on industry as a whole of the IFPA 
and its grantees. The assessment is based on a 
formula in statute: 40 P.S. 325.23
40 P.S. 325.22 (Powers of IFPA) and 40 
P.S. 325.23 (Trust Fund)
Rhode Island
No. The RI Insurance Division does not have a fraud bureau 
or unit. Various agencies are responsible for investigating 
fraud. 
Yes. The auto theft and insurance fraud unit 
is funded through assessment.
Funding for the auto theft and insurance fraud unit 
is funded via assessment per R.I.G.L. 31-50-4. The 
Office of the Automobile Theft and Insurance 
Fraud is funded by an annual assessment through 
insurers authorized to write automobile insurance 
in the state, in proportion to its market share, in an 
amount equal to $1 per year times the total number 
of registrations per vehicles having a gross weight 
of 10,000 lbs. or less. Insurers may collect the 
amount as a policy surcharge, separately 
identifiable on the policy declaration page or 
billing. In 2009, approximately $752,000 was 
collected to find the auto theft and insurance fraud 
unit. Other units are funded separately such as WC 
Fraud Unit that falls under the RI Dept. of Labor 
and Training. 28-37-1; 28-37-13.
R.I.G.L. 31-50-4; 28-37-1; 28-37-13  
State 
Does the Insurance Fraud Unit/Bureau receive 
funding from an assessment?
Does the Dept. receive an assessment 
intended ONLY for the Fraud/Bureau 
Unit? 
What is assessment based on? How much is 
the assessment? Assessment Statute or Citation
Virginia Yes Yes
The assessment is 0.05 of one percent of the direct 
gross premium income during the preceding 
calendar year. Assessments are deposited into a 
special fund designated  as "Virginia State Police, 
Insurance Fraud." 38.2-415
Utah Yes, the fraud unit is fully funded by an assessment
Yes. The fraud assessment is dedicated for 
use only by the fraud division. It is non-
lapsing and unspent money carries over to 
the next year. Fraud assessments are based 
on the annual premiums written for UT risks, 
annuity considerations, membership fees 
collected by the insurer, other fees collected, 
deposit types contract funds, and other 
considerations in UT.
$50 for consideration less than $1 million, $400 for 
consideration between $1, million to $2.5 million, 
$700 for consideration between $2.5 to $5 million, 
$1,350 for consideration between $5 million to $10 
million, $5,150 for consideration between $10 
million to $50 million, and $12,350 for 
consideration greater than $50 million. This 
generates approximately $1.5 million in revenue 
for the fraud division. 31A-31-108
Washington
Yes. The entire Office of Insurance Commissioner (OIC) is 
funded from assessments from insurance companies. The 
unit is part of the overall OIC budget but the fraud unit does 
not get a specific assessment.
No. No specific assessment for the fraud unit 
alone.
The regulatory surcharge is assessed for the costs 
of operating the Office of Insurance Commissioner, 
not just SIU. The maximum rate for the surcharge 
is .125%. The rate assessed depends on the type of 
insurer. regulatory surcharge includes: Health 
companies multiply total premiums by .9460% 
minimum fee $1,000, life/disability companies 
multiply direct premiums by .1100% minimum fee 
$1,000, property/casualty companies multiply 
direct premiums by .1100% minimum fee $1,000, 
title insurers multiply direct premiums by .1100% 
minimum fee $1,000. RCW 48.02.190
West Virginia
No. WV does not receive funding from an assessment for the 
Fraud Bureau.
Wyoming No. Wyoming does not have a fraud unit. N/A N/A
